PDNRL No. 32 Alex Watson: The Self's Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭhas's Arguments against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self. Vienna 2006, Hardcover, 433p. EUR 43.-

1.      Primary Sources Cited (17)

2.      Secondary Sources (26)

3.      Other Abbreviations and Symbols (44)

4.      Conventions (47)

Preliminary Remarks (49)

1.      The Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical Ātman Controversy (51)

2.      Śaiva Siddhānta (70)

3.      The Place of NPP within Śaiva Siddhānta (74)

4.      Rāmakaṇṭha’s Soul Doctrine in Relation to Those of the Brāhmaṇical Schools (90)

5.      Constitution of the Text of NPP (104)

6.      The Date of Sadyojyotis (111)

7.      The Date of Rāmakaṇṭha (114)

8.      Rāmakaṇṭha’s Style (115)

Background (125)   

1.      The Buddhist Challenge (126)

2.      The Naiyāyika Response (130)

3.      Vaiśeṣika (166)

4.      Sāṅkhya (192)

1.      Sadyojyotis’ Verse and its Context (209)

2.      Rāmakaṇṭha’s Own View. Is It Different from the Buddhist View? (213)

3.      Does the Perceiver Shine Forth as Stable or Momentary (Sthiragrāhakaprakāśa or Bhinnagrāhakaprakāśa)? (220)

4.      Is the Idea of Superimposition of a Permanent Perceiver Coherent? (236)

Background (257)

1.      The Co-Perception of Self and I-Cognition (271)

2.      The Constancy of I-Cognition (313)

3.      Do Verbal Cognitions Have Real Referents? (319)

Preliminary Remarks (333)

1.      Simultaneous and Sequential Illumination (335)

2.      The Self’s Cognition and the Buddhi’s Cognition (349)

Chapter 1 (389)

Chapter 2 (395)

Chapter 3 (404)

Chapter 4 (409)