PDNRL No. 32 Alex Watson: The Self's Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭhas's Arguments against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self. Vienna 2006, Hardcover, 433p. EUR 43.-
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Contents
Preface (9)
References, Abbreviations and Conventions
1. Primary Sources Cited (17)
2. Secondary Sources (26)
3. Other Abbreviations and Symbols (44)
4. Conventions (47)
Introduction
Preliminary Remarks (49)
1. The Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical Ātman Controversy (51)
1.1. Early Buddhism (52)
1.2. Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas and the Pramāṇa School (55)
1.3. Mādhyamikas (59)
1.4. Vātsīputrīyas (59)
1.5. The Soul Doctrines of Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā (60)
2. Śaiva Siddhānta (70)
3. The Place of NPP within Śaiva Siddhānta (74)
3.1. Extent and Manner of Engagement with Other Traditions (74)
3.2. The Soul in Śaiva Siddhānta and NPP (80)
3.3. Reliance on Śaiva Scripture (87)
3.4. Comparison with Pratyabhijñā (88)
4. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Soul Doctrine in Relation to Those of the Brāhmaṇical Schools (90)
4.1. Vedānta and Sāṅkhya in Brief (90)
4.2. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika (92)
4.3. Sāṅkhya (92)
Excursus on Rāmakaṇṭha’s Ideas about Liberation (96)
4.4. Knowledge of the Self (98)
5. Constitution of the Text of NPP (104)
5.1. Editions (104)
5.2. Manuscripts (105)
5.3. Parallel Passages (110)
5.4. Editorial Policy (111)
6. The Date of Sadyojyotis (111)
7. The Date of Rāmakaṇṭha (114)
8. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Style (115)
Synopsis of the Contents of the First Chapter of NPP (117)
Chapter I: Can We Infer the Existence of the Self?
Background (125)
1. The Buddhist Challenge (126)
2. The Naiyāyika Response (130)
Brief Remarks about the History of the Argument (159)
Philosophical Summary (163)
3. Vaiśeṣika (166)
3.1. The Philosophy of Nature Arguments (166)
3.2. The Argument from Qualities to Quality-Possessor (174)
Excursus on Acākṣuṣapratyakṣatva in Vaiśeṣika (176)
4. Sāṅkhya (192)
4.1. The Sāṅkhya Argument (192)
4.2. Cognition is Self-Illuminating (202)
Chapter 2: Can We Know the Self Through Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvedana)?
1. Sadyojyotis’ Verse and its Context (209)
2. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Own View. Is It Different from the Buddhist View? (213)
3. Does the Perceiver Shine Forth as Stable or Momentary (Sthiragrāhakaprakāśa or Bhinnagrāhakaprakāśa)? (220)
4. Is the Idea of Superimposition of a Permanent Perceiver Coherent? (236)
4.1. Sthiragrāhakaprakāśa is Internal, not External (237)
4.2. Superimposition Cannot Be Carried Out by Something Momentary (238)
4.3. Cognition Cannot Fool Itself (245)
4.4. Refutation of Self-Awareness? (251)
Chapter 3: Can We Perceive the Self Through I-Cognition (Ahampratyaya)?
Background (257)
1. The Co-Perception of Self and I-Cognition (271)
2. The Constancy of I-Cognition (313)
3. Do Verbal Cognitions Have Real Referents? (319)
Chapter 4: The Equating of Self and Cognition
Preliminary Remarks (333)
1. Simultaneous and Sequential Illumination (335)
Philosophical Summary (346)
2. The Self’s Cognition and the Buddhi’s Cognition (349)
Excursus on the Pauruṣa-Bauddha Distinction in Śaivism (373)
Conclusion (383)
Text Passages
Chapter 1 (389)
Chapter 2 (395)
Chapter 3 (404)
Chapter 4 (409)
General Index (417)