

NAGOYA STUDIES IN INDIAN CULTURE AND BUDDHISM

SAMBHĀṢĀ

32

Nagoya Studies in Indian
Culture and Buddhism,
32/2015, pp. 60-71

名古屋大学大学院文学研究科
インド文化学研究室

Department of Indian Studies
Graduate School of Letters
Nagoya University

2015

Eli Franco (ed.), *Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy*, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 37, Wien: De Nobili Research Library, 2013, viii + 388 Pp. €40. (Hardback)

Periodization is an extremely intentional activity that is performed in order to incorporate scattered events of the past into a chronological framework that one believes is most appropriate for understanding a history. Even before we discuss the Hindu periodization by *yuga* and *kalpa*, we need to acknowledge that every periodization reflects how one adopts one's stance on one's own age. In order to reconsider how chronological frameworks are constructed according to different trends within Indian philosophy, Eli Franco organized the panel "On the Historiography and Periodization of Indian Philosophy" at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, held in Kyoto in September 2009. The present volume is the proceedings of this conference, and consists of the following twelve articles.

Eli Franco: On the Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy.

Appendix by Shinya Moriyama: Some Periodizations of Indian Philosophy in Japanese Publications.

Shūjun Motegi: The Early History of Sāṃkhya Thought.

Philipp A. Maas: A Concise Historiography of Classical Yoga Philosophy.

Parimal Patil: The Historical Rhythms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Knowledge System.

Lawrence McCrea: The Transformations of Mīmāṃsā in the Larger Context of Indian Philosophical Discourse.

Julius Lipner: The Perils of Periodization, *or* How to Finesse History with Reference to Vedānta.

Vincent Eltschinger: Buddhist Esoterism and Epistemology: Two Sixth-Century Innovations as Buddhist Responses to Social and Religio-Political Transformations.

Anne Clavel: Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras: A Differentiated Periodization?

Lyne Bansat-Boudon: The Contribution of Nondual Śaivism of Kashmir to the Debate on *jīvanmukti*: A Thematic Perspective on the Question of Periodization.

Alexis Pinchard: The History of *Sphoṭa*: From Ontology to Epistemology?

Claus Oetke: Classification and Periodization of Indian Philosophical Traditions: Some Conceptual and Theoretical Aspects.

Johannes Bronkhorst: Periodization of Indian Ontologies.

First, the present reviewer shall summarize each article, and then comment on what Franco considers to be crucial for setting up a periodization of Indian Philosophy, taking the views of the other contributors into account.

In the keynote article of this volume, **Franco** describes how scholars have attempted to chronologically divide Indian philosophy. First, he takes up Paul Deussen and articulates his discontent with Deussen's representation of the post-Vedic period, in that he does not take the interaction between the

philosophical schools into account. Franco states that this is due to Deussen's admiration for Schopenhauer's monistic worldview. Next, he examines the periodization of Erich Frauwallner. According to Frauwallner, in the middle of the first millennium CE, just before the time of Śaṅkara, the history of Indian philosophy underwent a drastic shift as a result of the ethnic substitution of its main supporters, meaning that it changed from being "an Aryan period" to "a non-Aryan period." Moreover, Frauwallner characterizes the old systems (Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Lokāyata, Buddhism and Jinism) as atheistic and scientific, and the new systems (Vedānta and Hindu theologies) as relying on theistic revelation and the belief in a supreme god. Arguing that Frauwallner has a racist motivation in presenting this dichotomy,¹ evaluating what he sees as the Aryan period more positively, Franco criticizes this periodization as both "morally despicable" and "factually wrong," unjustifiably assuming that Buddhism and Jinism are non-religious, and characterizing the second half of the first millennium CE as a period of decline in rational thought.

After this, Franco presents the views of three scholars who were active in the second half of the twentieth century. Applying the Marxist view of Indian history, Walter Ruben interpreted each trend of thought as the ideology of a particular social class. Franco reveals that Ruben considered Indian people to have been addicted to a non-scientific idealist orientation, which also includes meditation. Madeleine Biardeau divided the history of Indian philosophy into three periods. The first period involved the formation of the philosophical systems, the second one spanned from the time of Dignāga to Rāmānuja, and the third one encompassed Hindu theology. In Biardeau's claim that Brahmin thought is dominated by static traditionalism, Franco finds an influence from Louis Dumont, who negated the existence of individuals in caste society. Franco then briefly presents John Plott's original "global" periodization through six periods from the axial age to the twentieth century. Lastly, attaching importance to ontology and epistemology, Franco presents his own periodization, "(1) the period up to Dignāga, (2) the period between Dignāga and Udayana, and (3) the Navya-Nyāya period." Admitting that his periodization consequently appears to be similar to Biardeau's, Franco suggests that his own is less prejudiced than those that preceded it. Judging from the names of the contributors in this volume, we can surmise that he intended to review as many perspectives as possible in order to reconsider the significance of period (2) within the wider history of Indian philosophy.

Without going into an evaluation of Frauwallner's characterization of Sāṃkhya as an Aryan atheism, **Motegi** basically agrees with him about dividing the early Sāṃkhya into the three periods: 1. Die Epische Urform des Sāṃkhya, 2. Die entscheidende Umgestaltung des Sāṃkhya durch die Einführung der Evolutionslehre, 3. Das System der 60 Lehrbegriffe. However, as regards Frauwallner's hypothesis that the emanation theory (Evolutionslehre) was

¹ In his recent study, *Der arische Ansatz. Erich Frauwallner und der Nationalsozialismus* (Wien, 2009), J. Stuchlik revealed that Frauwallner was actively involved in National Socialism.

effected by Pāñcaśikha, Motegi adduces the counter-evidence that in the Mokṣadharmā section of the Śāntiparvan of the *Mahābhārata*, chapters 211 and 212, which show the teachings of Pāñcaśikha, do not refer to primordial matter (*prakṛti*) at all. Thereafter, Motegi verifies the transition from period 1 to period 2 by analyzing the relevant chapters of the Mokṣadharmā, and clarifies the various meanings of *prakṛti* that were argued during period 2, especially in chapters 291-296, which are known as the dialogue between Vasiṣṭha and Kārāla Janaka.

It is generally accepted that the *Yogasūtra* compiled by Patañjali was later glossed by a person called Vyāsa in his *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*. Maas, however, doubts this common view saying “the *Pātañjala Yogaśāstra* (i.e., the *sūtra* passages together with the *bhāṣya* part of the work) is a unified whole that was possibly composed by one single author.” He explains why he denies the existence of two separate texts, calling on both the external evidence (no manuscript transmission of the *sūtra* alone, no consistent marking of each *sūtra* in manuscripts, etc.) and the internal evidence (reference by a *sūtra* to a part of the *bhāṣya* on another *sūtra*, etc.). Next, Maas summarizes the history of the research of the Pātañjala Yoga from the nineteenth century until Frauwallner, and reports the present state of the study of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa*, in particular, on textual criticism and the problem of authorship (whether the author is identical with the Advaitin Śaṅkara). Maas is very positive about Gerhard Oberhammer’s classification (in his *Strukturen yogischer Meditation*, Wien 1977) of the object of the Pātañjala meditation into three kinds: one’s self (*puruṣa*), a personal high god, and finally, the remembered object, which is gradually transformed in the reverse order of the Śaṅkhyā emanation until it is “finally reduced to primordial matter (*prakṛti*).”²

Since 2000, Sheldon Pollock has intensively been investigating the Sanskrit knowledge system in various fields in the pre-colonial and early colonial periods (ca. 1550-1750). Moreover, with the phrasing “the ends of man,” Pollock argues that the creative period of Sanskrit intellectuals in each field came to an end with the establishment of the British colonial system in the last half of the eighteenth century. Calling this scenario “Pollock’s narrative,” Patil raises an objection with respect to the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowledge system. First, he summarizes Pollock’s analysis of the renewal of Sanskrit culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into five points.³ However, judging from all these criteria, Patil describes the rise of a new knowledge system in the case of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, half a millennium earlier than Pollock had estimated, at the time of Udayana (eleventh century) whose renewal was resumed by Gaṅgeśa (thirteenth century). Then, in order to reverse Pollock’s declaration that Indian philosophy had died, Patil lists the names of representative scholars between 1750 and 1900 and the titles of their work. Moreover, as “the alternative signs of life,” Patil demonstrates that Sanskrit intellectuals in this period launched many kinds

² Cf. G. Oberhammer, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199; *Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya* 1.45. Here, *prakṛti* is called “*aliṅga*.”

³ Namely, a significant “efflorescence” of writings, the rise of new textual genres, the canonization of these texts, a return to their foundational texts, and the multi-disciplinarity of individuals.

of new projects, such as the setting up of institutions for Sanskrit including colleges, the foundation of Sanskrit periodicals, and the publishing of many series of Sanskrit works across India. In conclusion, Patil proposes re-examining the criteria about what should be counted as traditional or innovative.

In the well-known topic of the seventh-century Indian philosophy where the school of Mīmāṃsā splits into two sub-schools, the school of Kumārila and the school of Prabhākara, **McCrea** finds a key to thoroughly reconsidering the whole history of Mīmāṃsā. Considering that before and after Śabarasvāmin's time there were many Mīmāṃsakas whose exegetic views were different from Śabara's, he argues that Śabara's commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra could become standard owing to Kumārila and Prabhākara, who basically conform to him. As regards the trigger that brought about Śabara's standardization, McCrea pays attention to Dignāga's radical innovation in terms of how to compose a philosophical treatise. For the first time in Indian philosophical circles, Dignāga precisely quoted concrete phrases from particular texts of schools that opposed him to be able to convincingly refute their theories. In order to respond to Dignāga's criticism based on this unprecedented text-based methodology, the Mīmāṃsā exegetists, on the one hand, had to defend a special text of their own instead of their vaguely defined positions, and on the other hand, had to examine each other on how to interpret this fundamental text. The former necessity, according to McCrea, led to a standardizing of Śabara's commentary, especially the philosophical portion of Vṛttikāra's commentary that Śabara quoted, whereas the latter necessity prompted the split between the Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara schools.

McCrea's perspective is worth re-examining carefully. Here, the present reviewer only points out that this contradicts K.S. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī's perspective. According to Śāstrī,⁴ when the school of Mīmāṃsā originated, there were already two groups: the conservative one, represented by Bādari, and the reformatory one, represented by Jaimini. The conservative group regarded the performance of a sacrifice as an unconditional duty, being taken over by Prabhākara, whereas the reformatory group regarded it as utilitarian activity, taken over by Śabara and then by Kumārila. Even today, we can find a supporter of this perspective in Kei Kataoka.⁵ However, this is totally anachronistic as the opposition that was amplified in medieval time is projected into ancient time, and prejudiced in favor of the Bhāṭṭa, insisting that there was a natural succession from Śabara to Kumārila. In fact, Prabhākara never criticized Śabara in explaining individual *sūtras* (cf. McCrea, n. 1), and he explicitly and repeatedly criticized Bādari's refusal to consider the act of sacrificing as a way to accomplish its result (*phala*), as recorded in Śabara's commentary on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.1.3.⁶ In his dichotomy

⁴ "Introduction," *Tantrarahasya*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 24, 2nd ed., Baroda, 1956: xi-xxxix.

⁵ "Introduction," *Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing, Part 2: An Annotated Translation of Mīmāṃsā-Slokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra)*, Vienna, 2011: 17-20.

⁶ Cf. *Brhaṭi* (Madras University Sanskrit Series) pt. 4, 960,4-5: *nanu bādariṇāpi viniyoga evāsāv upanyastah. ata evāsau nirākṛtaḥ*; pt.4, 978,2-3: *ata eva bādarer eṣā bhrāntiḥ dravya-guṇasaṃskāreṣv eva śeṣatvam iti*; pt. 5, 14,5-6: *ayam (= the opponent's view in the svargakāma-adhikaraṇa) eva cāsau bādaripakṣaḥ, dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣv ity evaṃ sambandhāvagamam*

of the whole history of Mīmāṃsā, K.S. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī exposes a biased example of what Julius Lipner calls “evaluative periodization.”

Before going into the periodization of Vedānta, **Lipner** poses a methodological question. He asks “What is periodization?” and answers that it is a kind of classification, presenting two types of classification: one is an artificial construct that can be altered at will according to changing external circumstances, like an army deployed for successful fighting; the other is an integral whole that reveals the pre-determined internal structure of a matter of fact, like a fish that has been dismembered by a skillful fishmonger. Lipner then comments that today most historians seem to view history as “a contingent trajectory of events,” unlike Hegel or Comte who advocated a pre-determined history. He also adds a proviso that, even if history is viewed as contingent, we can look for turning points, taking the Copernican paradigm shift in the history of astronomy as an example. Moreover, Lipner distinguishes between the “simple periodization,” based on a simple succession of observed events and the “evaluative periodization,” based on the assessment of these observed events.⁷

Lipner then moves on to the periodization of Vedānta. His periodization is unique since, according to him, the philosophical tradition of Vedānta, in its strict sense, begins when the Vedāntins have incorporated the *Bhagavadgītā*, in addition to the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtra*, into their basic scripture. From this perspective, which Lipner claims to be a “simple periodization,” the starting point is Śaṅkara, who wrote a commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*. He also settles another starting point in Rāmānuja from the perspective of sectarian theism. Then, examining some examples of the “evaluated periodization” of Vedānta, he finds a denigration of Rāmānuja in B.N.K. Sharma’s history of the Dvaita-Vedānta, a separation of successors from their founder, Śaṅkara, in Swami Satchidanandendra’s history of the Advaita-Vedānta, and Western Orientalism in George Thibaut’s introduction to his translation of Śaṅkara’s *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.⁸

Consulting the copious amount of recent studies on the political and social change in early medieval India, the sophistication of Buddhist logic and epistemology, and the emergence of Buddhist Tantrism under the influence of Hinduism, **Eltschinger** examines how and why epistemology and Tantrism have rapidly and simultaneously emerged in Buddhism under drastically changing social circumstances. Against the traditional view, which assumes that there was a radical breakthrough of Buddhist Tantrism in the seventh century due to the compilation of the texts of “pure Tantrism” (*caryā-lyoga-tantra*), Eltschinger maintains that Indian Buddhism had already accomplished a tantric ritual system in the sixth century, paying special attention to the *Kāraṇavyūhasūtra*, which adopts various means of esoteric rituals for adoring Avalokiteśvara. Summarizing the vast works of R.M. Davidson and A. Sanderson, Eltschinger assumes that

manyate, na yāgaphalapuruṣeṣv iti.

⁷ Lipner adds that Frauwallner applies the controversial term “scientific” to what he calls the Aryan period, thereby implying superiority without due justification.

⁸ Unfortunately, a copy of the first page of Eltschinger’s article strays into Lipner’s article on page 163.

because Śaivism achieved the most prominent success among the religious sects in the early medieval society, the compilers of the *Kāraṇḍavyūhasūtra* appropriated Śaiva ritualism in order to effectively compete for the royal patronage that carried increasing financial weight in Buddhist monasteries.

Eltschinger describes Dharmakīrti's view, pointing out that, on the one hand, he accepted the Tantric orientation admitting the efficacy of formulas (*mantras*) if pronounced by a person endowed with cognitive and psychological excellence; but on the other hand, he rejected the idea that *mantra* itself has any "natural efficacy" (*bhāvaśakti*). According to Eltschinger, this latter idea was widely accepted in Buddhist Tantrism from the seventh century onward.⁹ In the dialectical methodology adopted by Buddhist philosophers, Eltschinger finds a crucial shift before and after the sixth century due to the religious crisis. Until the time of Vasubandhu, most polemics were intra-sectarian: that is, directed to other denominations within Buddhism, including the Abhidharma scholasticism and the Mahāyānist's attacks on the Śrāvakayāna. However, representative Buddhist scholars from the sixth century onwards, such as Sthiramati, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Kamalaśīla, were unanimous that the purpose of compiling a logical treatise is to make the adherents of anti-Buddhist schools abandon their own schools by debunking the credibility of their theories of knowledge. Eltschinger also notes that Dharmakīrti made regular use of self-designations such as *Bauddha* and *Saugata*, which marks a first among Buddhist philosophers. Eltschinger concludes that the Buddhist philosophers from the sixth century onwards came to eschew a narrow denominationalism setting forth their apologetics on behalf of Buddhism against the increasingly menacing non-Buddhist sects and schools.

After splitting into the two sects of Digambara and Śvetāmbara, the Jaina order gave rise to many prominent philosophers, as did Buddhism, owing to its institutional system of monastery. Regarding the periodization of both sects, Clavel examines two theses, one by K.K. Dixit and the other by I.C. Shastri, and reconsiders some assumptions that both authors took for granted. Both Dixit and Shastri distinguished between the age of *āgama* and the age of logic; that is, the age in which scholars were commenting on traditional *āgamas*, and the age in which they dealt with philosophical issues in independent treatises. Both agree that the age of logic began with Kundakunda and Siddhasena Divākara (Shastri adds Samantabhadra) and ends with Yaśovijaya in the eighteenth century. Clavel, however, finds it difficult to assume an opposition between the traditional attitude that is faithful to *āgamas* and the innovative attitude based on the theory of *pramāṇas*. For one thing, there were seeds of the logical reflection of epistemology even in traditional *sūtras*, for example, in the *Nandīśūtra*. In addition,

⁹ Any examples of the "*bhāvaśakti*" inherent in *mantras*, if found in the sixth-century texts of Hindu or Buddhist Tantrism, would make Eltschinger's argument that Dharmakīrti was active in the sixth century more convincing, because Dharmakīrti, a non-Tantrist, must have borrowed this concept, which is not used in Mīmāṃsā, from somewhere else. If there is no example of "*bhāvaśakti*" in the sixth-century Tantric texts, this would change into a double-edged sword that would prove Dharmakīrti to belong to the seventh century.

Jaina philosophers laid claim to be consistent with the scriptures by distinguishing the empirical level from the transcendental level. For example, Akalaṅka includes sense-perception into “direct” means of knowledge only on the empirical level, because in scriptures it was seen as “indirect,” with only supernatural cognition being accepted as “direct.”

“Liberation in this life” (*jīvanmukti*) appears to be paradoxical because, from the view of the classical soteriology, the emancipation (*mukti*) from the state of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) can be achieved after death as a result of a lifelong effort to strictly control one’s senses, volition, and actions. However, from the view of the Trika system accomplished by Abhinavagupta in the eleventh century, what is required for emancipation is the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) that one is never separable from the absolutely free God, Śiva, and therefore that one is already free in this life. **Bansat-Boudon** investigates this notion of *jīvanmukti* in earlier literatures elucidating its indebtedness to other systems. Whereas, outside of the Śaiva literature, the term *jīvanmukti* can be traced back only to the Advaita-like texts, such as the *Yogavāsiṣṭa* (tenth century) and the *Mokṣopāya* (eighth-ninth century), *jīvanmukti* is implied in the ideal of “one whose wisdom is established” (*sthitaprajñā*), which is advocated by the *Bhagavadgītā*, and acknowledged by Śaṅkara as the state of those who do not act anymore, but are obliged to live due to their own past *karman* already being set in motion. On the contrary, the term *jīvanmukti* is already formulated in early Śaiva literatures such as the *Svacchandatantra* which may have been compiled in the sixth or seventh century. Later, the texts of the Spanda and Pratyabhijñā, such as the *Spandakārikā*, radically criticize the idea of “yogic suicide” or *utkrānti* for dualistically assuming the separation of the body from the absolute spirit. However, the Trika philosophers revealed the truth about *jīvanmukti* only to those who had gone through initiation. By means of this “esotericism,” they intended to relativize their confrontation with orthodoxy. Moreover, in spite of the ontological difference from dualism, they agreed with Sāṃkhya thought that liberation is only accessible through discriminating knowledge, and construed *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 68, which is famous for the simile of the potter’s wheel that revolves for a while after the making of a pot has been completed, as referring to *jīvanmukti*.

Kashmir Śaivism is also much indebted to the philosophy of Sanskrit grammarians, especially to Bhartṛhari’s monistic and idealistic theory of language. **Pinchard** pays attention to *Vākyapadīya* 1.44-45, in which Bhartṛhari distinguishes two ways of processing words (*śabda*): one is the occasion (*nimitta*) through which words appear to consciousness, the other is connected with its meaning (*arthe prayujyate*). Following S.D. Joshi (*Sphoṭanirṇaya of Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa*, Poona 1967), he maintains that this marks a turning point in the history of the linguistic theory of *sphoṭa* because, since the time of Patañjali, the notion of *sphoṭa* had been connected only with single phonemes devoid of any meaning even though Patañjali vaguely admits that a single mental unit called an “aggregate” (*saṃghāta*) of phonemes bears the meaning. By shifting the agent of conveying the meaning from mental phonemes to *sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari considered a complete word or morpheme as forming a *sphoṭa*.

If one attempts to periodize Indian philosophy with the intention of carrying out one's own philosophy, then one has to examine the premises given in one's own periodization because "*philo*" (loving)- "*sophia*" (knowledge) is not the accumulation of knowledge without questioning the method that one actually follows for gaining knowledge. Focusing on this methodological problem, **Oetke** advises that care should be taken when judging which text pertains to philosophical matters. In particular, Oetke warns that one could lose sight of philosophically important things if one is intent on arranging scholastic contents according to "historical development" imposed by external criteria and arbitrary perspectives. In this respect, he is very positive about the third section of H. von Glasenapp's *Die Philosophie der Inder*, titled "Die weltanschaulichen Hauptprobleme," because, in this section, von Glasenapp compares philosophical trends in order to locate them in theoretically possible stances on philosophical problems, instead of being pushed into a stereotype of historical development.

Instead of Frauwallner's biased dichotomy between Aryan and non-Aryan, **Bronkhorst** proposes a combination of other types of dichotomy. He starts with a generally recognized opposition between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers, and then relates these two parties to the two types of ontology, Brahmanism to the realistic ontology and Buddhism to the non-realistic ontology, ascribing the reason to the social tendency for Brahmins to be more involved in the secular life of the royal court than Buddhists. According to Bronkhorst, there was also a geographical dichotomy in ancient times between Vedic culture in northwest India and another culture, which Bronkhorst calls "greater Magadha"¹⁰ in the region to its east, and in which he considers the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution to have emerged. This belief was later adopted by the intellectuals in the Vedic culture, and, as a result, the two schools of Brahmanical ontology, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, came into existence. Despite competing with each other in the theory of causality, both schools are influenced by the religious belief in the "greater Magadha" as they both advocate a concept of a self that, in reality, does not act and therefore has no responsibility for action. However, orthodox Brahmins were not satisfied with this because both schools were only loosely linked with the Vedic tradition.¹¹ In the second half of the first millennium CE, Mīmāṃsā finally took an ontological turn and developed the idea of karmic retribution within the Vedic tradition.

What Lipner calls "evaluated periodization" in a history of philosophy always entails the risk of lapsing into partiality, which the author shows, whether deliberately or not, in attempting to convince readers that the philosophical

10. Cf. J. Bronkhorst, *Greater Magadha. Studies in the Culture of Early India*, Handbook of Oriental Studies, section 2 India, volume 19, Brill, 2007. K. Klaus wrote a critical review of this work in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Bd. 161, 2011: 216-221.

11. It is to be noted that Kumāṛila includes Sāṃkhya and Yoga in his list of heretic sects, together with Pāñcarātra, Pāśupata, Buddhism, and Jinism. Cf. *Tantravārttika*, in: *Mīmāṃsā-darśanam*, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97, 1st ed., 194,10; 2nd ed., pt. 2, 112,19-20. Moreover, commenting on the phrase "*smārte caite*" in *Brahmasūtra* 4.2.21(20), Śaṅkara and Bhāskara acknowledge that Sāṃkhya and Yoga are expounded in *smṛti*, but not in *śruti*.

position with which the author is mainly occupied is more valuable than other positions. The conspicuous achievements that Frauwallner produced in many fields of Indian philosophy should not be underestimated. Without duly consulting his studies based on his extensive knowledge of the relevant literatures, we cannot even find the starting point for the arguments in these fields. However, granting that the Sāṃkhya soteriology only requires rationally distinguishing the individual self (*puruṣa*) from material surroundings, without resorting to devotional belief in God, it may be inappropriate to consider the Sāṃkhya system as a whole to be an atheistic philosophy of “Aryans,” which I call the people who follow the Vedic tradition, excluding the influence from the natives who believe in god(s).¹² This is because, following Frauwallner, we find the decisive reform (die entscheidende Umgestaltung) of Sāṃkhya in the theory of emanation developed in the Mokṣadharmā.¹³ In the abovementioned dialogue between Vasiṣṭha and Karāla Janaka,¹⁴ in which the idea of the emanation from the primordial matter (*prakṛti*) is explicitly introduced into the Sāṃkhya system, the highest and eternal *brahman* (12.291.11) is described by the epithet of Śiva, “*śambhuḥ*” (291.15), when creating this universe. Regarding the principles (*tattvas*) of creation, the eternal soul (291.39) is called Viṣṇu and counted as the 25th principle on which all the other principles depend (291.37). Moreover, it is to be noted that *prakṛti* is called a “goddess” (*devī*) (292.27), who is said by *puruṣa* in his monologue (295.23-38) to have seductively captured him into the bodies she produced using different kinds of wombs in the state of transmigration.¹⁵

¹² Regarding the term *antīśvara* that appears in 12.238.7, 289.3 and 294.40, G.J. Larson summarizes the controversy as to its meaning and construes it to mean a person for whom *īśvara* is irrelevant from the point of view of salvation, irrespective of whether *īśvara* exists (*Classical Sāṃkhya*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, reprint, Delhi, 2001: 124-126).

¹³ Reexamining chapters 187 and 239-241, which Frauwallner regards as representing “die epische Urform des Sāṃkhya,” H. Bakker and P. Bisschop reaffirm that these chapters teach about the psychological process of how the *buddhi* is modified into *manas* and sense-faculties without ontological implication of *prakṛti* (“Mokṣadharmā 187 and 239-241 reconsidered,” *Asiatische Studien* 53, 1999: 459-472). In his “On the Origin(s) of the *Guṇa*-Theory,” *Asiatische Studien* 53, 1999: 537-551, A. Wezler casts doubt on the “historical” connection that Frauwallner claims exists between the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti* in the classical Sāṃkhya and the three ur-modifications of the being (*sat*), namely, fire, water and food, advocated by Uddālaka in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6, by pointing out that this claimed connection is not supported by the fact that the three *guṇas* are distinguished by the three mental conditions (*bhāvas*) of the *buddhi*; namely, pleasure, pain, and indifference, in Mokṣadharmā 187. In chapter 224, P. Hacker finds a pre-Sāṃkhyic cosmogony from Brahman as well as a tension between the mechanical creation and the theistic creation (“The Sāṃkhyization of the Emanation Doctrine,” *WZKSÖ* 9, 1965: 75-112). In the theistic creation, Hacker notes that the primordial matter is signified in the “imperishable” (*akṣaya*) which, having awoken at the end of the cosmic night, Brahman is said to differentiate (*vikurute*) (224.31ab). As regards the “un-manifested” (*avyakta*) in the Mokṣadharmā, K. Kanō finds that “*avyakta*” shifts from an adjective for *brahman* (Chapters 203-290) to that for *prakṛti* (294-321), and regards this shift as a sign of the development of dualistic thought (“*Avyakta* and *Prakṛtivādin*: A monistic and Theistic Sāṃkhya,” *Studies in the History of Indian Thought* 12, 2000: 60-82).

¹⁴ Teun Goudriaan pays attention to the close affinity between the three stages of consciousness distinguished in *Mahābhārata* 12.291-293 and the five stages distinguished in *Svacchanda-tantra* 11.83-126 (“The Stages of Awakening in the Svachchanda-Tantra,” in *Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism, Studies in Honor of André Padoux*, State University of New York Press, 1992: 139-173). I am indebted to Shūjun Motegi for telling me about this article by Goudriaan.

¹⁵ Yūko Yokochi kindly informed me that the *prakṛti* as a female deity is called *māyā* and is

Viṣṇu and Rudra-Śiva appear in the Vedic pantheon. It is declared in *Rgveda* 1.164.46 that the only-one being (*ékam sād*) is given various names of gods. The term “*prakṛti*” is used to denote something original and primary in contrast to “*vikṛti*” in various contexts of ritual, grammatical, medical, and political literature of the earlier time.¹⁶ Moreover, Indian meditation, especially, the *upāsana* formulated in Vedānta and Dharmaśāstra, can be traced back to a Vedic origin in the internalization of the Vedic sacrifice and the correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm described in Brāhmaṇas. However, what Vasiṣṭha tells Janaka that he has seen in meditation,¹⁷ the vividly recalled primordial awesome vision of the emergence and dissolution of one’s existential surroundings from and into the primordial matter, which is comparable to a female deity, probably does not have its origin in the Vedic tradition,¹⁸ given that this vision was formulated in Sanskrit by reformative Brahmins.¹⁹ What is more, it is well known that, alongside the simile of the chariot, the *Kaṭha-upaniṣad* (KU) teaches the process of the meditation of the principles, including “the un-manifested” (KU 3.11: *avyakta*), corresponding to *prakṛti*. But taking into account KU 2.23, which proclaims that the omnipresent (*vibhu*) self (*ātman*), which is inaccessible by teaching, intelligence, or learning, chooses (*vṛṇate*)²⁰

paired with Maheśvara as an “illusionist” (*māyin*) in *Śvetāśyataropaniṣad* 4.10. Cf. Y. Yokochi, “The Warrior Goddess in the Devīmāhātmya,” *Living with Śakti: Gender, Sexuality and Religion in South Asia*, Osaka, 1999: 71-113, n. 8.

¹⁶ In his *Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2002: 27-51, K.A. Jacobsen collects these examples including *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.30 and 5.1.12, in which “*prakṛti*” means ordinary material cause.

¹⁷ 12.294.6-25 forms a manual for *yoga* practice. What the *Yoga* practitioners see (*paśyanti*) is recognized (*anugamyate*) by the Sāṃkhya theoreticians (12.293.30).

¹⁸ Among the creation myths of the *Rgveda*, the *Puruṣasūkta* (10.30) refers to a principle of creation given a feminine name, *virāj* “sovereignty,” which is born from and gives birth to the primordial colossus, *puruṣa*. *Atharvaveda* 8.10 extolls *virāj* as a primordial goddess who consecrates the constituents of the world and the five sacrificial fires (imaged as masculine deities with a masculine noun “*agnī*”) by descending into them (cf. Junko Sakamoto-Goto, “Zur Entstehung der Fünf-Feuer-Lehre des Königs Janaka,” *Akten des 27. Deutschen Orientalistentages*, 2001: 157-167). This *virāj* cannot be a Vedic origin of *prakṛti* because, unlike *prakṛti*, she has nothing to do with the materiality that determines the physical existence of individual human beings. By comparing with the earliest Purāṇic literature, P. Hacker (“Two Accounts of Cosmogony,” *Festschrift J. Nobel*, 1959: 77-91) elucidates that the creation myth in the first chapter of the *Manusmṛti* tells two cosmogonies, one modeled on the theistic Sāṃkhya emanation (vv. 5-30, especially, vv. 14-19), and another, a modification of the *Puruṣasūkta* (vv. 31-50), in which *virāj*, a man (*puruṣa*) born from the feminine half of *brahman*, creates *Manu* with ascetic toil (vv. 32-33). Here the cosmogony of the *Puruṣasūkta*, which is adopted by the author of the *Manusmṛti* for the purpose of authorizing the class system by four *varṇas* (v. 31 & v. 87), is distinguished from the Sāṃkhya emanation that explains how physical bodies are formed (vv. 17-19).

¹⁹ In the provisions of the *Manusmṛti* about inheritance, the Vedic patriarchal ideology identifying a son with his father strongly remains (cf. *Manusmṛti* 9.8 and *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa* 7.13.9-10). In the section about the family affiliation of a son, *Manu* distinguishes the seed, a metaphor for one’s father by blood, from the earth, a metaphor of one’s mother, in 9.37: *iyaṃ bhūmir hi bhūtānāṃ śāśvatī yonir ucyate / na ca yoniguṇān kāṃś cid bījaṃ puṣyati puṣṭiṣu* // “This earth, indeed, is called the eternal womb of creatures; yet the seed, as it develops, does not manifest any of the qualities (*guṇa*) associated with the womb.” (tr. by P. Olivelle, *Manu’s Code of Law*, OUP, 2005). This verse does not indicate the Sāṃkhya worldview, because the Sāṃkhya regards the development of a human being in secular society as the result of the personal activities promoted by the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* (cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 3.5 and 27). In the preceding verse 36, the seed is said to become manifest (*vyañjita*) through its own *guṇas*.

²⁰ For the verb *vṛ* “choose” conjugated in the fifth class of the present system, see Ch.H. Werba,

who can grasp him, we can say that this *ātman* is imagined as a personified god and that this Upaniṣad is already influenced by the early stage of Hindu theism. In the *Nārāyaṇīya* (12.321-339), the most developed theistic chapter of the Mokṣadharmā, the gradual dissolution of five elements to mind (*manas*), to the un-manifested, and finally to the eternal soul called Vāsudeva, is revealed in 12.326.28–31. Furthermore, in the soteriology of medieval times, both Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava theologians advocated the meditation in which one contemplates on the process of Sāṃkhya emanation. This should be regarded as the revival of theistic Sāṃkhya, rather than as the subsuming of an atheistic Aryan thought in terms of an instance of Hindu inclusivism.

Unless one simply arranges events in time-series and mechanically bundles them into each century, it is impossible to postulate a periodization without any evaluation. Despite being called “simple” by Lipner, his periodization of Vedānta, beginning with Śaṅkara, entails clear evaluation because he regards Uttaramīmāṃsā, the exegetic speculation of Upaniṣads, as immature Vedānta on account of its seemingly scanty concern about the theistic religion that is typically revealed in the *Bhagavadgītā*. In this evaluation, Lipner underestimates the fact that the *Brahmasūtra* is actually based on a theistic worldview that identifies *brahman* with God (*īśvara*). Even Franco describes his evaluation, calling the period between Dignāga and Udayana “the golden period of Indian philosophy” (p. 25). The present reviewer is tempted to concur with this. How is it then possible to avoid prejudice and partiality in setting up a periodization of the history of Indian philosophy?

It may be rewarding to attempt to find, in the texts of this period, evidence to reconsider whether or not individuals could be seen to exist within caste society as argued by Louis Dumont, whose strong influence Franco finds in Bieardeau’s periodization. Cultural anthropologists have constantly criticized Dumont’s *Homo Hierarchicus* for its analysis of caste hierarchy, on account of his methodology of attaching more importance to the religious contrast between purity and impurity systematized in Brahmin’s legal codes, than to the political and economic factors that are only accessible through the fieldwork of secular communities. Making this criticism seems to be a compulsory “rite of passage” for them, and this evaluation extends even to their criticism of the incapability of philological studies to investigate pre-modern Indian society. Above all things, it is a grave problem that public opinion and academic administration have become sympathetic toward this extended ongoing negative portrayal.

However, are all researchers of Indology satisfied with Dumont’s strict dichotomy between the group thinking mentality of laymen in caste society and the individualism of the renouncers? It is true that Brahmins were required to comply with the value and norms aimed at the maintenance of the traditional community, whereas renouncers trained themselves to be freed from them in their own way, and in many respects Brahmin philosophy has changed itself in response to the challenges by Buddhists and other renouncers. Nevertheless, it is

also true that Brahmin society was maintained and gradually changed by individual human beings, even if their mentality was different from that of European individuals. The ideal of *jīvanmukti* is surely an antithesis to the impossibility of individual freedom within caste society. Recent studies of early medieval religions have revealed that Tantrism is not restricted to obscene radicalism but has a more profound influence in lay society than Dumont assumed. Therefore, is it not possible to consider the development of logic and epistemology from the time of Dignāga, not only as a result of the intensified competition among different schools for patronage, but also as a result of the intellectual interest in the ability of an individual human being, an interest that increased in a society which was relatively more affluent than in ancient times? In the eyes of the present reviewer, even the ontology of Kumārila, the most eloquent spokesman of the Aryan orthodoxy, shows the intention to investigate how an individual who is given free will and a physical body can use a limited number of things in this world to act in conformity with traditional norms.

If we succeed in elucidating the image of individual human beings as being newly built up in the early medieval period, not only by using philosophical treatises and religious scriptures, but also by using secular literatures and historical documents, then we may be able to investigate how it was taken over by Hindu theologians in the next period, from about the eleventh century onward, when Abhinavagupta, Udayana, and Rāmānuja appeared. Reading through the present volume, the present reviewer has come to the conclusion that Dumont's dichotomy is much harder to deal with than Frauwallner's, and needs to be overcome more urgently by researchers of Indian philosophy.