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*Perspektivismus und Kritik.* Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell der Jainas angesichts der Polemik gegen das Vaiśeṣika in Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā. [*Publications of the De Nobili Research Library XXXVI*]. Wien: Sammlung de Nobili, 2012. 401p. € 28.– (ISBN 3-900271-42-9).

The work under review is an annotated translation and study of two excerpts from the tenth-century Jaina philosopher Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā (SŚP). The SŚP, "The Investigation Whether Teachings are True," of which there is a single edition, edited by Gokulchandra Jain (Calcutta 1964), refutes a series of ten non-Jaina traditions: Brahmādvaita, Śabdādvaita, Vi-jñānavāda, Citrādvaita, Cārvāka, Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā. In the present work the author focuses on the Vaiśeṣika section, specifically, the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* that critiques the notion of inherence (*samavāya*), by translating and commenting on the relevant passage from that section together with a passage from the beginning of the work that provides the framework and motivation for the critical investigation of other theories. Although Jainism is known as the tradition that acknowledges different perspectives, that does not mean that it accepts that competing philosophical views are true. The theories under examination in the SŚP err in taking an exclusive or one-sided position, and they must be refuted in order to vindicate the one true teaching that supersedes them all, namely, the teaching of many-sidedness (*anekāntaśāsaṇa*; see text I 4, p. 170f.). And indeed – also contrary to a common misconception about Jainism – the criterion of truth to be applied in assessing other theories appeals manifestly to the principle of non-contradiction: a teaching is true if it is not contradicted by perception or other assumptions or presuppositions (*drṣṭeṣṭāvīruddha*). That is the charge to be brought against the Vaiśeṣika, in particular, that his theory of categories as "completely / in every respect different" (*sarvathābhinna*) from each other is contradicted by perception (SŚP 35,27-31).

The passages of the SŚP under examination are treated according to a very rigorous philological-historical methodology. An extensive introduction (Part I) provides a great deal of helpful background: Section IA3 (p. 41-54) situates the SŚP in relation to the common Jaina philosophical project of the *anekāntavāda* – this is one of the clearest accounts of "Jaina perspectivalism" the reviewer has ever read. IA4 (p. 54-60) summarizes the main points of the Jaina debate with the Vaiśeṣika. IA5 (p. 60-67) gives an overview of the argument Vidyānandin (V.) specifically develops in the first part of his *uttarapakṣa* against the Vaiśeṣika concept of inherence, to which the Vaiśeṣika appeals in attempting to explain why a whole may not be perceived as different from its parts. IA6 (p. 67-88) compares the method of treating competing world views followed by V. with other "pluralistic epistemological models," in the process clarifying in what sense the *anekāntavāda* can be said to be a kind of "inclusivism," while IA7 (p. 88-91), at least implicitly, defends it fairly persuasively. Section B of the introduction (p. 93-104) further explains, independently of textual references, the problems entailed by the concept of inherence, using diagrams.

After these illuminating preliminaries the author proceeds to the text of the SŚP itself (Parts II and III). He devotes sections of Part II to: (1 [p. 107-118]) a brief description of the published edition of the SŚP (the author has not undertaken a critical edition) and a discussion of the probable dates of V. and his relation to other Dīgambara figures, (2 [p. 119-1 '5]) a very clear outline

of the contents of the translated excerpts, (3 [p. 127-140]) an explanation of the criteria used for identifying and categorizing parallel passages, and (4 [p. 141-157]) the application of these criteria in determining the sources of the SŚP and, on that basis, giving a detailed picture of its structure and composition (see below). Finally, in Part III, which comprises p. 159-301 of the work, the translation of the excerpts accompanied by a philological–historical commentary is presented. The excerpts are broken by the author into segments (“Textabschnitte,” which differ from the paragraphs of Jain’s edition) representing steps of V.’s arguments. The text of each segment is given in transcription with parallel passages marked by superscript letters (which are then, below the text, identified as direct or indirect citations, references, etc., along with the corresponding works), variant readings marked by superscribed Roman numerals, and longer passages, marked by superscript Greek letters, that extend across the segments and appear to be indebted to other sources. (This system takes some time to learn, but it is brilliantly conceived and flawlessly executed.) Two appendices include: (1 [p. 305-324]) translations or summaries of passages from four other Jaina works that concern themes relating to the SŚP discussion of Vaiśeṣika, including a passage from V.’s own *Yuktyanuśāsanatīkā* that bears some parallels to the SŚP critique of inherence; (2 [p. 325-333]) indices of parallel passages, ordered according to varying degrees of coincidence, as well as unidentified references; (3 [p. 337-350]) schematic presentations of the Jaina *naya*- and *syādvādas*, using the author’s own system of geometric symbols (which the reviewer, unfortunately, did not find very helpful); and (4 [p. 351-375]) the excerpts printed in Devanāgarī, with the segments into which they are divided in Part III clearly marked, together with a running translation without annotations and with minimal use of brackets. This part of Appendix II will be extremely useful to non-specialists who want to access the content of the text without the “distraction” of philological analyses, but who may still refer back to the detailed discussions of the segments in Part III if they wish.

Just this (incomplete) summary of the contents of the work should indicate the exhaustiveness and meticulousness with which these relatively short excerpts (only eleven pages combined in the Devanāgarī version) have been processed. Sometimes the reviewer felt a bit overwhelmed by the intricacy and extent of the philological machinery, yet he must admit that the results are extremely impressive. Every term and concept in the text is thoroughly – and convincingly – explained, so that in the end the literal meaning shines forth brilliantly. Every idea and argument addressed by V. is traced back to its antecedents in earlier philosophical literature. Indeed, the relation of the SŚP to its historical context is illuminated to a degree one would not have thought possible. The author has made every attempt to identify all passages from both Jaina and non-Jaina works that V. cites, alludes to, or may have only been influenced by, as well as citations of / references to the text by later authors (esp. Prabhācandra) and parallel passages in V.’s own works. Certainly, one of the most significant achievements of the study is the analysis of the composition of the Vaiśeṣika portion of the SŚP in IID (p. 141 ff.). Here the author offers plausible hypotheses regarding passages where V. seems to have depended on other sources, and what those may have been, and passages that seem to be his own creations. In many instances, of course, one is able to identify Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika sources, especially the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*; in others, one can discern a reliance on Samantabhadra. For one significant portion of the text, corresponding to segments II 14-29, the author speculates, on the basis of two references to Dharmakīrti and another to Prajñākaragupta, and from a pattern of parallel passages in the works of Prabhācandra, that V. may have had before him another work “belonging to a Buddhist milieu” (p. 154) that developed some of the same arguments against *samavāya* he employs. The table on p. 157 is a thing of beauty: it assigns the segments representing the first part of the *uttarapakṣa* to different stages of its argument in a very transparent way, while also indexing them according to “Vergleichsstellen.”

One cannot really do justice to a work of this complexity and richness in a short review. The reviewer hopes that he will sufficiently convey his admiration by saying simply that he believes

it is a resource, not only for V.'s thought but for Jaina metaphysics generally – for it is about much more than just these two passages of the *SŚP* – that scholars will consult with benefit for years to come. There is only one place where the translation did not ring true, and that is the translation of the difficult and possibly corrupt text of segment II 13. But even there the author has the integrity to note an alternative translation (p. 199), suggested by someone else, which seems, intuitively, to be the correct one.

There is only one aspect of the book with which the reviewer found himself strongly disagreeing, and that is the implication that, outside of presenting us with a possible model for mediating disputes between conflicting world-views, the *SŚP* offers little in the way of philosophical interest (p. 40f.): “Relevanz erhielt das Werk damit nur aus philologisch-historischer und aus philosophie-historischer Sicht: Zum einen gibt das Werk einen Einblick in den jeweiligen historischen Entwicklungsstand der behandelten philosophischen Traditionen und den Stand der Diskussion zu Teilproblemen, zum anderen repräsentiert die Art des Umgangs mit konkurrierenden Weltentwürfen, nämlich diese insgesamt für null und nichtig zu erklären, einen in der Geschichte der Philosophie häufig unternommenen Versuch, abweichender Geltungsansprüche Herr zu werden.”

In fairness, the author suggests immediately prior to this that one might “accommodate” V., whose cosmological views are completely outdated, by having a look at his philosophical arguments. It is, however, the discussion of the “Teilprobleme” in the text that, the reviewer believes, would pique the interest of any contemporary philosopher. Merely the following elegant statement of V.'s core argument against the *Vaiśeṣika* will make this clear (p. 61): “Die Irrealität der Annahmen des *Vaiśeṣika* wird dadurch zu beweisen gesucht, dass die aus der Kategorienlehre entwickelten Faktoren des Einzeldinges in der Sinneswahrnehmung nicht zur Erscheinung kämen, da das Prinzip, das ihr gemeinsames Auftreten (*vṛtti*) beim Einzelding und damit die Sinneswahrnehmung eines konkreten Einzeldinges angeblich ermöglicht, die Inhärenz (*samavāya*), nicht in der Weise gedacht werden kann, dass es mit den Elementen der von ihr zu stiftenden Verbindung selbst in Verbindung treten könnte, und deshalb selbst nicht auftreten (*avṛttimat*), außen vor bleiben würde. Wenn aber die Inhärenz nicht schlüssig etabliert werden kann, gibt es keine Verbindung zwischen den die Welt aufbauenden Faktoren. Das Weltgebäude des *Vaiśeṣika* zerfällt in zueinander nicht in Beziehung stehende Bruchstücke; ohne Verbindung geht der Zusammenhalt der Dinge verloren (*sakalārthahāni*).”

A contemporary metaphysician would find this fascinating. Although the concept of inherence does not get much play in philosophical discussions these days, the more general problem of the nature of properties, and the notions of the instantiation of properties and the “compresence” of tropes, certainly do. Thanks to studies and translations such as the one under review philosophers have reliable guides to the theories and arguments of classical Indian philosophy that could potentially provide them with much food for thought.

John Taber